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
INTRODUCTION 
The world still remembers the self-immolation of the Tunisian fruit vendor as a protest 
against the abuses and corruption of the government authorities, who would regularly and 
arbitrarily harass him and confiscate his property. The December 2010 event set in motion a 
series  of  widespread  protests  and  civil  unrest  that  eventually  gave  rise  to  the  Tunisian  
Revolution and catalyzed the wider Arab Spring. In a similar vein, protesters in Egypt and 
Yemen from 2011 onward commonly wore loaves of bread strapped to their heads—so-called 
bread helmets—to protest the rising costs of staple foods.1 These events encapsulated the 
salience of increasing food prices as one of the principal grievances among the protesters of 
the Arab Spring, even though other political factors such as economic stagnation and 
widespread opposition to authoritarianism were commonly seen as the preeminent motives 
of the uprisings. In fact, the crisis of rising food prices in 2007 and 2008 extended beyond the 
Arab World to a range of countries in the developing world and Africa in particular; in these 
countries, rising food prices were often followed with widespread protests and civil unrest as 
well.2 
This paper expands on the premise that food prices can serve as a proximate cause to civil  
unrest worldwide, especially in developing countries. In order to examine the specific 
conditions that prompt food price rises to result in civil unrest, this paper first outlines the 
mechanisms of the 2007-2008 food crisis and the historical context from which it emerged. 
                                               
1 Sutton, Naguib, Vournelis, & Dickinson, 2013 
2 McMichael, 2009 
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Second, this paper reviews an array of existing research that connects changes in food prices 
with the incidence of civil unrest while presenting explanations for why such riots occurred 
in some countries and not others. This research reveals that food prices are a complex 
phenomenon with a close correlation to a variety of economic, social, and political factors 
and that even rapid changes are not always associated with unrest.3 Third, this paper presents 
a set of empirical measures that attempt to quantify the specific characteristics of a political 
economy that capture variation between the developing economies in Africa. These 
quantitative measures relate conceptually to previous literature, but the combination of these 
measures as a means to quantitatively operationalize the development economy in particular 
is currently untested in previous literature. In turn, Africa was chosen as the research sample 
since the continent experienced significant cases of civil unrest that coincided with the price 
crisis and since reliable conflict data were readily available for the continent. Fourth, this 
paper tests those measures of the political economy with measures of food-related civil unrest 
to expose any statistical correlation between the two. Finally, this paper examines Egypt's 
experience over the course of the 2007-2008 price crisis as a case example and evaluates the 
response of the government to that crisis to place the quantitative models within a concrete, 
qualitative context. Above all, Egypt was chosen as an example due to the prominence of the 
widespread civil unrest it experienced and the clear connections of that unrest to the food 
price crisis; hence, any successful statistical model ought to relate to Egypt's experience at 
least in part.  
                                               
3 Lagi, Bertrand, & Bar-Yam, 2011 
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Therefore, the empirical model that ensues from the statistical testing seeks to determine the 
factors of the political economy in which food price volatility and subsequent food riots are 
most likely to occur. Put simply, this paper endeavors to offer alternative explanations to why 
food price riots occurred in some countries but not others in the years surrounding the 2007-
2008 price spike. Understanding this context may significantly improve the predictive power 
of food price volatility as a precursor to civil unrest as well as present opportunities for policy 
proposals to reduce the incidence of food-related civil unrest. Using empirical data on African 
countries between 2005 and 2011, when the most recent and most dramatic price hikes in 
global food prices occurred, I hypothesize that countries with more stable political 
economies, which is operationalized through the measures selected for the empirical model, 
are less likely to experience food-related civil unrest. 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
In the past century, a number of new circumstances fundamentally altered the significance of 
food as an economic and political force.4 Whereas malnourishment and famine are persistent 
human experiences and continue to plague many parts of the world today, the 
commodification of agricultural products on a global scale has gradually rendered price over 
scarcity as the primary factor determining access to nourishment.5 In other words, the 
question raised is increasingly not whether food is available, but rather at what price. At the 
same time, the international development community has promoted the commodification 
and globalization of food: development initiatives encouraged a movement from subsistence 
                                               
4 Friedmann, 1995 
5 Magdoff, 2008 
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farming to export-oriented commercial farming, which promised a stream of currency that 
could be used to reduce debt, purchase goods and, most notably, replace the farm output that 
was now producing export crops with imports of cheaper staple foods from abroad.6 At face 
value,  the  importation idea  is  noble:  developing  countries  could  rely  on a  steady  supply  of  
cheap food from efficient agricultural operations in the industrialized countries rather than 
risk famine due to weather or conflict at home. However, importing basic necessities 
effectively enmeshed developing countries into a dependence on foreign supplies and global 
markets, which are volatile and unpredictable.7 The political  economy of agricultural  trade 
also entails a number of unaddressed inequities within the global supply chain, such as the 
heavy subsidies industrialized countries place on their agricultural products, the interruption 
of agricultural development in the developing world, and the intertwinement of trade 
liberalization with neoliberal structural adjustment programs.8 Finally, the mounting strain 
on worldwide food production in the face of the massive increase in world population over 
the course of the past century remains unaddressed. 
Sweeping changes in the patterns of worldwide agriculture in the 1970s and 1980s prompted 
an intensified academic focus on the political economy of food. Researchers began to examine 
the notion of the access and availability of food as food security, which transcended scarcity 
to include the concepts of self-sufficiency and external dependency in food procurement in 
the context of globalized commodity markets.9 Harriet Friedmann provides a compelling 
                                               
6 Patnaik, 1996 
7 Ivory, 1990 
8 Friedmann, 1993 
9 McMichael, 1994 
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account of this transition in her article The Political Economy of Food: a Global Crisis.10 She 
characterizes the postwar food regime as one that favored the maintenance of national farm 
programs through protectionist policies, such as tariffs and state agricultural regulations. In 
addition, the system enabled the subsidized export of the chronic surpluses in American 
agricultural production. Dependency theorists such as T. N. Srinivasan and Kevin Watkins 
note that dumping surplus agricultural production in the United States as cheap exports to 
developing countries protected American agriculture from price crashes,11 but  that  the  
practice  also  created  a  dependence  on  cheap  world  wheat  supplies  in  countries  that  were  
previously self-sufficient in food.12 The  food  crisis  of  the  early  1970s  showcased  the  
cataclysmic effects of rapid rises in agricultural prices as a result of sudden scarcity rather than 
surpluses: unable to restart the domestic production of staple foods, unable to replace 
domestic drought losses with imports, and unable to outbid industrialized countries for scarce 
resources on the global market, severe famine appeared around the developing world.13 This 
pattern was particularly prominent in perilous famines in Ethiopia and Bangladesh during this 
time.14 To ease the post-crisis strains on agricultural production, the agricultural markets of 
the world experienced a process of rapid liberalization and an end to regular surplus dumping 
over the course of the 1970s. In consequence, the behavior of profoundly volatile food 
                                               
10 Friedmann, 1993 
11 Watkins, 1995 
12 Srinivasan, 1989 
13 Friedmann, 1993 
14 Schnittker, 1973 
6 
 
markets began to govern access to food in the developing world, which still lacks the means 
for adequate indigenous agricultural production.15  
The emergence of the contemporary food regime as a product of these trends made sudden 
and sizable shifts in consumer food prices prevalent worldwide. In fact, the liberalization of 
agricultural trade in the wake of the 1970s crisis increased world agricultural imports by 34 
percent by 1980; when only developing countries were measured, that figure was an 
astonishing 122 percent.16 Even though the crisis prompted a reorientation away from export 
cropping to domestic food production in many developing countries,  that trend was never 
sufficient to unshackle the developing world from a dependency on agricultural imports and 
market prices.17 Another price crisis occurred in 2007 and 2008 when international prices for 
staple commodities rose to their highest levels in nearly three decades: corn prices doubled 
from 2006 to 2008 while wheat reached its highest price in 28 years.18 Skyrocketing prices 
resulted in a 25 percent increase in food import expenditures in developing countries, which 
were quickly passed along to consumers in those countries. Developing countries are affected 
more severely when food commodity prices rise not only because they import a larger share 
of their staple foods, but also because their citizens spend a more sizeable proportion of their 
income on food as compared to households in developed countries. For example, even the 
poorest fifth of Americans spend only 16 percent of their budget on food while an average 
Nigerian family spends up to 73 percent.19 Whereas crises in previous years were often 
                                               
15 Clapp, 2012) 
16 Ivory, 1990) 
17 Friedmann, 1993) 
18 "Editorial: The World Food Crisis," 2008 
19 "Editorial: The World Food Crisis," 2008 
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associated with outright food shortages, the impacts of structural adjustment, uneven growth, 
and rapid urbanization have rendered food insecurity a problem of access and affordability 
for the urban poor, who rely much more on markets for food supplies as compared to rural 
populations.20 For example, the urban population of Ghana purchases 92 percent of 
consumed food while more than 97 percent of the global urban poor are net food purchasers.21 
It is no wonder that the World Bank estimates as many as 130 to 155 million people plunged 
into poverty in 2008 as a result of the recent food crisis. 22 With scant options for substituting 
expensive imports with local produce, urban households throughout Africa were pushed to 
malnourishment and to trade spending on other necessities, such as health care and 
education.23 Although  policy  solutions  to  a  problem  of  access  seem  more  elusive  than  
solutions to a scarcity problem, the transformation places unprecedented opportunity for 
central governments to intervene. 
The spectrum of academic literature on the 2007-2008 crisis presents an enormously wide 
range of possible causes to the crisis. For example, the director of the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) Shenggen Fan and researcher Derek Headey consider 
international market speculation, widespread crop failures, and a surge of biofuel production 
(which prompted a renaissance in export cropping in the developing world) as causes to the 
crisis.24 In contrast, Cornell Professor Philip McMichael views the wider context of the 
                                               
20 Maxwell, 1999 
21 J.Cohen & arrett, 2010 
22 UN. The Global Social Crisis. 2011 
23 Maxwell, 1999 
24 Headey & Fan, 2008 
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contemporary food regime as a central catalyst for the crisis.25 Whereas my paper does not 
participate in this debate per se, it assumes a common premise within this literature—that 
international markets command enormous weight in determining consumer prices for food 
in the developing world—in grounding the hypothesis that specific properties of the political 
economy are responsible for promoting the incidence of food-related riots. In addition, this 
paper assumes a clear correlation between food prices and food riots, which was prominently 
investigated in the context of the recent crisis by Yaneer Bar-Yam, a physicist at the New 
England Complex Systems Institute, who coauthored a study that was widely cited in 
academia and major media outlets around the time of the Arab Spring. In that paper, Bar-
Yam connects a range of protests and other events within the recent uprisings in Africa and 
the Middle East to concurrent trends in global food prices.26 In particular, the study claims 
that  civil  unrest  is  significantly  more  widespread  when  a  specific  cost  threshold  for  staple  
foods is exceeded. Unfortunately, Bar-Yam ignores cases where price increases failed to 
translate into riots, which impedes any attempts to draw causal correlations between prices 
and riots. 
Marc Bellemare (2011) expands on this research in an attempt to empirically show a causal 
relationship between food prices and civil unrest. Bellemare's article searches media reports 
on civil unrest to determine which instances of unrest are associated with food-related 
grievances, and such instances are then correlated with data on food prices over the course of 
                                               
25 McMichael, 2009 
26 Lagi et al., 2011 
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the past two decades.27 The article finds a statistically significant relationship between the 
two, which Bellemare considers as a reliable indicator of a causal relationship: the results are 
robust, the methodology accounts for the endogeneity problem of price hikes and civil unrest 
occurring concomitantly, and the source data is both complete and reasonably reliable. 
Interestingly, the article concludes that unlike price rises, price volatility with food 
commodities is negatively correlated with political unrest. Together with Bar-Yam’s paper, 
Bellemare's work provides the essential empirical foundation for the grounding assumption 
of this paper, which assumes a correlation between food prices and civil unrest. 
More recently, academics have attempted to answer the underlying academic question of this 
paper: why riots occurred in some countries and not others. However, this research remains 
relatively scant. This paper responds most directly to Julia Berazneva and David Lee (2013), 
who were among the first explore some of the more ultimate causes of the 2007-2008 food 
crisis with an empirical model that focuses on socio-economic and political factors.28 With 
this model, the authors attempt to show that food riots were more probable in countries with 
specific configurations of these variables. Their independent variables center on a variety of 
political variables, such as the Political Rights Index, the Civil Liberties Index, and a measure 
on urban agglomeration. The authors find that higher rates of poverty, urbanization, 
oppressive political regimes, and wider civil liberties are associated with a higher likelihood 
of riots in Africa. These variables are statistically significant, even though the article retreats 
from establishing  causality.  Also,  it  is  important  to  notice  that  the  article  considers  a  very  
                                               
27 Bellemare, 2011 
28 Berazneva & Lee, 2013 
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narrow subset of riots and protests that excludes cases upon cases of civil unrest that did not 
result in casualties or were otherwise too minor for the authors to consider. 
Above all, this paper ventures to parallel the work of Berazneva and Lee by researching 
alternative realms of variables that characterize countries where food riots were more 
probable to occur. Importantly, this paper does not seek to disprove the political variables of 
Berazneva and Lee; instead, this paper considers alternatives to complement the work of 
these authors. It strives to contribute to the wider sphere of academic work that searches for 
statistically significant characteristics to differentiate countries that were more likely to 
experience riots around the 2007-2008 crisis from those that were not.  Thus the variables 
examined this paper are an attempt to quantitatively operationalize the notion of a political 
economy in a developing country; in other words, this paper employs variables that 
characterize dissimilarities in the political economies of African countries.  
This paper proposes and empirically examines three models with varying approaches in 
operationalizing the political economies of African countries around the 2007-2008 crisis. 
The variables in the first model were chosen to represent the dependence of an economy on 
foreign financial support as well as the quantity and liquidity of any financial assets available 
to  the  government  at  the  time  of  civil  unrest.  These  variables  are  associated  with  the  
aforementioned notion that governments maintain an unsurpassed opportunity to safeguard 
vulnerable populations from global price spikes so long as they command the assets and the 
financial independence to do so. It follows, then, that this model explores variables that relate 
to constraints in the political economy with which governments in Africa must contend. The 
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second model attempts to operationalize the quality of governmental institutions and their 
efficiency with managing the political economy. This model is conceptually aligned with the 
previous model in recognizing the role of government in buffering the effects of price spikes 
and is conceptually complementary in examining the extent to which governments can 
implement such policies in the first place. Finally, the third model considered in this research 
paper also attempts to measure the capacity and quality of governance but with an emphasis 
on the characteristics of the wider political environment. This model is motivated by the 
notion that  the  capacity  of  governments  to  enact  and enforce  policy  during  price  crises  is  
checked by the nature of the political environment even when governments command 
sufficient resources and maintain robust and effective institutions. 
Because of the considerable conceptual departure from the quantitative measurements of 
Berazneva and Lee, who emphasize variables measuring the relationship between 
governments and the civil society, this paper does not attempt to control for any of the 
variables they explore. In addition, this paper assumes the empirical association between food 
prices and food riots as explored in previous literature and attempts to remove itself from the 
academic debate surrounding some of the more proximate causes for the 2007-2008 food 
crisis. For these reasons, this paper only controls for the size of the economy to make sure 
that the issue of scale is taken properly into account. This diagram sums these relationships 
to previous literature in this paper: 
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The following sections of this paper introduce the data, the variables, and the empirical 
methodology that are employed to establish correlation between specific properties of the 
development political economy and the incidence of food-related civil unrest in the years 
surrounding the 2007-2008 food crisis. 
QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGY 
The scope of this research project includes every country in Africa with annual data starting 
from 2005 and ending in 2011 (see annex). Importantly, this time horizon comprises the 2007-
2008 food crisis, which was associated with widespread civil unrest in the developing world; 
the years surrounding the crisis are included in order to measure changes as compared to the 
pre-crisis period and the post-crisis period when no new acute food price crises occurred on 
the world scale.  
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The dependent variable of this research project is the occurrence of food-related civil unrest, 
which counts every case of civil unrest that was mentioned in written media and is positively 
associated with food-related grievances. The dependent variable is common across each of 
the three models explored in this paper. For the purposes of the variable, civil unrest includes 
protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, and government violence against civilians; in 
every instance, a strict association with food prices or expense-limited availability is required 
as  identified  in  the  dataset.  The dependent  variable  is  sourced from the  Social  Conflict  in  
Africa Database (SCAD), which systematically catalogues social conflicts at a level of detail 
much  beyond  other  conflict  datasets  while  also  counting  conflicts  that  do  not  involve  
casualties or armed encounters. SCAD is an outstanding set of conflict data that does not yet 
exist in other continents with considerable numbers of developing countries, such as Asia or 
South America. Since collecting new conflict data is unequivocally outside the scope of this 
paper, the accessibility and reliability of SCAD rendered researching Africa much more 
feasible than other continents with significant civil unrest at the time of the 2007-2008 food 
price crisis. The dependent variable of this paper considers every instance of civil unrest that 
occurred between 2005 and 2011 and where either the primary, secondary, or tertiary source 
of tension was recognized by SCAD research staff as related to food and subsistence. The 
resulting data was pruned manually to exclude cases where the case commentaries written by 
the research staff were not strictly related to food prices in particular. 
Each country in the dataset was then given a “1” for every year that it experienced at least one 
instance of a qualifying event of civil unrest, and coded with a “0” for years when such events 
were not recorded. That means that the dependent variable in this research paper does not 
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consider the relative intensity or frequency of the various instances of civil unrest aside from 
annual changes, because such datasets were simply unavailable or unreliable. Nonetheless, the 
dependent variable conveys considerable variation from one country and one year to another; 
for example, some countries experience food-related unrest around the price crisis while 
other experience no such unrest at any point. 
All three models examine the statistical correlations between their respective sets of 
independent variables and the common dependent variable through logit regressions, which 
express a statistical probability for the positive outcome of the dependent variable, or the 
occurrence of civil unrest prompted by food prices over the course of a given year. The logistic 
regression equations of the three models can be expressed as follows: ModelͳPr(ܻ = 1| ଵܺ,ܺଶ,ܺଷ,ܺସ,ܺହ) = ܨ(ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ + ߚଷܺଷ + ߚସܺସ + ߚହܺହ) ModelʹPr(ܻ = 1| ଵܺ,ܺଶ,ܺଷ,ܺସ,ܺହ,ܺ଺,ܺ଻,଼ܺ)= ܨ(ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ + ߚଷܺଷ + ߚସܺସ + ߚହܺହ + ߚ଺ܺ଺ + ߚ଻ܺ଻ + ߚ଼଼ܺ) Model͵Pr(ܻ = 1| ଵܺ,ܺଶ,ܺଷ,ܺସ,ܺହ) = ܨ(ߚ଴ + ߚଵ ଵܺ + ߚଶܺଶ + ߚଷܺଷ + ߚସܺସ + ߚହܺହ) 
...where X1 through Xn refer to the independent variables described in the following sections. 
Logistic regression was chosen as the method of statistical analysis because the method is 
especially suited for the continuous nature of the independent variables and the binary nature 
of the dependent variable, whereby each country either experienced, or did not experience, 
15 
 
food-related civil unrest over the course of any given year. Because the logistic regression 
considers panel data with fixed effects, dummy variables were created for each country and 
each  year  in  the  dataset.  The  regression  models  also  accounts  for  the  effects  of  the  other  
independent variables within the same model so as to eliminate any confounding impacts of 
those variables if they were considered separately. Therefore, any conversations about the 
associations of independent variables with the dependent variable in this paper make the 
assumption that other variables within the same model are kept constant. In this approach 
to regression analysis, positive coefficients represent a higher probability of civil unrest when 
the value of the independent variable rises in parallel, and negative coefficients represent this 
relationship in inverse. Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficients represents the 
strength of the effects of a given independent variable in producing changes in the occurrence 
of a positive outcome in the dependent variable, or with the occurrence of civil unrest. 
Several shortcomings in the quantitative dataset are important to acknowledge so as to 
delineate the limitations in predictive power and statistical inference in this analysis. First, 
two of the three models experience missing data points from when countries either stopped 
reporting relevant data to the World Bank or when experts at the World Bank refused to 
complete their evaluations due to missing primary source data (see the following sections). 
This skews the scope of statistical inferences since missing data points elevate the chance of 
making  either  type  I  or  type  II  errors.  Second,  the  scattershot  nature  of  the  most  of  the  
independent variables means that the logistic regressions do not fit the data especially well. 
Third, this study does not control for a sufficient number of factors to rule out neither 
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confounding nor intervening variables or the possibility of a reverse direction of association. 
In  other  words,  this  approach does  not  provide  guarantees  that  the  independent  variables  
bring  about  change  in  the  dependent  variable  rather  than  the  other  way  around.  For  that  
reason, causal conclusions cannot be made on the basis of the quantitative approach here. 
Nonetheless, statistically significant correlations are extraordinarily important to guiding 
further research and the direction of academic conversation, which is what this paper aims to 
accomplish. 
In terms of accounting for intervening variables, the three models considered in this paper 
are  constructed in  such a  way  that  following  models  consider  less  proximate  causes  to  the  
occurrence  of  civil  unrest  than the  previous  models.  That  is  to  say  that  the  second model  
considers  the  conceptual  underpinnings  of  the  first  model,  and  the  third  model  considers  
more  underlying  causes  than  either  of  the  other  two  models.  The  purposes  and  mutual  
relationships of the models can be visualized in the following manner: 
 
MODEL 1: ECONOMIC CAPACITY FOR POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
This model employs a range of quantitative measurements of a political economy as 
independent variables. The purpose of these variables is to capture variance in the nature of 
the political economies of the countries in the dataset. In the context of this paper, a political 
Model3:natureofthepoliticalenvironment Model2:qualityofpolicyandmanagemeent Model1:economiccapacityforpolicyinterventions
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economy refers to a macroeconomy within the framework of the political institutions that 
shape its structure through policy choices; again, this paper hypothesizes that certain 
macroeconomic characteristics guided by these policies change the preponderance of a 
country to food-related civil unrest. An association between this class of variables and the 
dependent variable remains to be tested in any preexisting literature. Each of the independent 
variables are sourced from the database of World Development Indicators at the World Bank 
and capture each metric annually. The independent variables were chosen as conceptually 
valid measurements of the state of a political economy and so that the variables represent as 
a wide range of political economic properties as possible, which range from debt stocks to 
budgetary balance. However, it is important to realize that some variables include missing 
data on certain years in certain countries when such data was not reported by local authorities 
to the World Bank. For that reason, any independent variable with a significant amount of 
missing data was not considered in the empirical analyses for this paper, which may 
inadvertently exclude countries without systematic annual data collection from the results. 
The following independent variables were included in the empirical analysis: 
1. External  debt  stocks  (%  of  GNI)  –  refers  to  the  amount  of  external  debt  owed  to  
nonresidents repayable in currency, goods, or services. The amount of total external 
debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term 
debt,  use  of  IMF  credit,  and  short-term  debt.  This  amount  is  considered  as  a  
percentage of the Gross National Income (GNI), which is the sum of value added by 
all resident producers to the national economy. This variable constitutes a measure of 
the extent to which a country maintains borrowing capacity from international 
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lenders,  which  is  one  way  for  governments  to  acquire  additional  assets  to  continue  
importing food in times of price spikes. 
2. Cash surplus/deficit (% of GDP) – refers to the balance between the revenue and 
expenses of the central government as a percentage of Gross National Product (GDP), 
which is a measurement of the size of a national economy that is closely related to the 
aforementioned GNI. The presence of a surplus or a deficit operationalizes the 
amount of discretionary expendable funds that the government commands over the 
course of a year, and which a government may choose to spend to account for price 
spikes. 
3. Total reserves – refers to the sum of monetary reserves held by the central government, 
including assets in gold as well as foreign exchange reserves. The reserves are expressed 
in current U.S. dollars, which puts the reserves into perspective with the cost of goods, 
services, or debt servicing on any given year. This measurement differs conceptually 
from the measurement of budgetary surpluses and deficits in that reserves are typically 
less liquid and reserves accumulation reflects longer-term trends in national finances. 
4. Gross savings (% of GDP) – represents the difference between disposable income and 
consumption within a national economy as a whole. The measurement is calculated 
simply as gross national income less total consumption, plus net transfers. The gross 
savings rate operationalizes the notion where consumers accumulate savings that they 
may use in times of financial hardship. 
5. Net ODA received (% of gross capital formation) – refers to the amount of net official 
development assistance (ODA) per capita received as a proportion of gross capital 
19 
 
formation in a given country. ODA comprises of grants and loans made on 
concessional terms that are coordinated via a number of international 
intergovernmental institutions. Gross capital formation refers to changes in the fixed 
assets and inventories of a national economy as reported by enterprises and industries. 
The ratio of aid to gross capital formation provides a measure of a country's 
dependency on foreign aid, which is operationalized as a relationship between both 
aid and capital formation. 
Together, these variables attempt to capture characteristics of a developing macroeconomy 
with a significant capacity to affect the capacity of a government to respond to food price 
crises  and  safeguard  the  vulnerable  populations  to  an  extent  that  suppresses  any  
predispositions for rioting and unrest. 
The regression model reveals statistically significant associations with three of the 
independent variables and no significant associations with the two remaining variables. Debt 
stocks, cash surpluses or deficits, and total reserves were all significant at the standard alpha 
of 0.05. Neither the ODA nor gross savings variables were significant at that alpha, although 
the ODA variable would be significant with more lenient alphas. An abridged version of the 
statistical output is presented in the table below: 
Independent 
variable 
Odds ratio Coefficient P-value 
External debt 1.0067  2.67 0.007 
Surplus/deficit 0.8546 -2.55 0.011 
Total reserves 1.0000  2.25 0.024 
Gross savings 0.9614 -1.43 0.154 
Net ODA 0.9930 -1.80 0.072 
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According to the results above, the following observations can now be made: 
- Larger  external  debt  stocks  are  associated with  a  higher  probability  of  food-related 
unrest. 
- Budgetary surpluses are associated with a smaller probability of experiencing civil 
unrest. In turn, budgetary deficits are associated with larger probabilities of civil 
unrest. 
- When governments command larger total reserves, they are more likely to experience 
civil  unrest.  Total  reserves  are  distinct  from  budgetary  surpluses  in  that  they  
incorporate non-liquid monetary possessions in addition to cash reserves. 
- When countries receive more overall foreign aid—including grants and subsidized 
loans—they are less likely to experience civil unrest. However, the statistical 
significance of this observation is unclear. 
The results of the statistical model give rise to a number of interesting inferences regarding 
the way in which certain properties of the national political economy may empower civil 
unrest when food prices skyrocket. The association with external debt stocks is particularly 
germane, because so many African countries owe significant amounts to foreign lenders. 
Unlike debt stocks owned by domestic actors, the interest payments associated with loans 
leave the country and presumably get spent elsewhere; in other words, there is no circulation 
of money and the money multiplier effect gets cut short. That external debt stocks are 
associated with civil unrest gives credence to the notion that indebted countries cannot 
muster the financial leverage to borrow more money to meet unexpected rises in worldwide 
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food commodity prices. In consequence, these countries cannot subsidize staple foods or 
provide  indigenous  food  aid  to  the  most  needy  as  well  as  countries  with  better  access  to  
borrowing.  This  variable  seems  like  a  prime  example  of  the  way  in  which  the  political  
economy can affect the extent to which food price crises can translate into hardship among 
consumers, which can elicit people to take to the streets in protest.  
The size of the governmental cash surplus or deficit signifies another variable with a 
statistically significant correlation with civil unrest as well as a variable that makes conceptual 
sense. In fact, the conceptual framework of the variable is similar to that of external debt 
stocks in that this variable also expresses the extent to which a government has access to extra 
funding. The main difference is that cash surpluses can be spent on very short notice on food 
imports, price subsidies, or food aid. In addition, a cash surplus is generally viewed as a short-
term indicator of effective government and the state of the political economy.29 Hence it 
makes sense that surpluses are negatively correlated with civil unrest, because governments 
can quickly employ monetary resources to buffer the societal costs of sudden price rises on 
staple goods. An interview with Samya Beidas-Strom, a senior economist at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), emphasizes that governments can play pivotal roles in safeguarding 
the public from price shocks by using “fiscal space if available to reduce taxes on food, and if 
needed draw on external finance to support the balance of payments and international 
reserves.”30 The combination of this variable as well as previously mentioned variable on the 
                                               
29 Pessoa & Williams, 2012 
30 "Policy Options for Riding Out Food, Fuel Price Spikes," 2012 
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size of the external debt stock provides a great measure of the fiscal space that Beidas-Strom 
mentions. 
The statistical significance of the third variable is perhaps the most conceptually confusing 
result of the regression model. In a similar vein to cash surpluses and debt stocks, monetary 
reserves are one measure of the fiscal capacity of a government, albeit arguably the most 
oblique of these three variables. At first, it seems to make no sense that countries endowed 
with extensive monetary reserves would be more susceptible to civil unrest. Indeed, foreign 
exchange reserves in particular (a component of total reserves) are often cited in literature as 
a source of macroeconomic stability and resistance to exogenous crises, including sudden food 
price rises.31 For  example,  news  articles  regularly  mention  the  lack  of  adequate  foreign  
exchange reserves in Egypt as a correlate to continued distress associated with food prices.32 
Limited reserves of foreign exchange may also prevent the procurement of key import 
commodities required in agricultural production, such as fertilizer and fuel. However, the 
composition of the foreign exchange reserves in each country varies significantly by the extent 
to which the reserves are composed of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the economic 
sectors that receive such investments.33 In practice, monetary reserves often comprise 
comparatively  fixed  assets,  which  may  not  readily  convert  into  the  fiscal  space  needed  to  
contain the damage of food price crises. These considerations encumber the conceptual 
validity of the variable (or underscore an extraneous factor that is not controlled) and may 
                                               
31 Patel, 2012 
32 Goldman, 2012 
33 "Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Performance and Potential," 1999 
23 
 
explain why the sign of the coefficient is positive rather than negative. But since the variable 
remains statistically significant, more experimentation with other versions of the variable—
such as one that only accounts for foreign exchange reserves while excluding more fixed 
assets—is in order. 
Finally, neither of the remaining variables appeared statistically significant in the regression 
model. Even though the notion of national gross savings as a measure of protection against 
sudden economic hardship makes conceptual sense on a cursory level, it is probably too 
circuitous to correlate directly with the incidence of food-related civil unrest. Firstly, gross 
savings are often too minor to actually provide sufficient purchasing power when food prices 
rise, especially since such price crises are often associated with major inflation that renders 
savings useless. Secondly, the variable does not take the distribution of the savings within the 
population into account. Indeed, most developing countries are characterized by extensive 
income inequality, which means that most savings are concentrated among the commercial 
sector and the rich. Further research ought to develop a measure of gross savings rate that 
takes income inequality into account; unfortunately, reliable and consistent data on income 
inequality is often difficult to come by. The last variable—the quantity of ODA received—is 
susceptible to comparable conceptual shortcomings, even though the variable is close to 
achieving statistical significance. For example, the variable does not take the allocation of aid 
into account, which means that the ODA under consideration might comprise of unrelated 
expenditures, such as highway construction or sanitation systems. In addition, ODA is often 
characterized by long-term projects rather than short-term crisis responses. Further research 
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ought to consider a variable that only measures short-term crisis aid as long as such metrics 
are available. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  the  statistical  correlations  expressed  in  these  results  must  be  
qualified with the relatively low number of included observations as well as the relatively low 
pseudo R2 score. The former is a consequence of missing data, a phenomenon that occurs 
often when complex statistical data is sourced in developing countries. On the other hand, 
the latter refers to the extent to which the source data follows the statistical model, and a low 
score is probably a consequence of the scattershot nature of data associated with such a large 
set of heterogeneous cases, or countries. Nevertheless, the three statistically significant 
variables of the regression model achieve a large confidence score, which gives much credence 
to the conceptual argument that that those variables are associated with the framework of 
the  political  economy  framework  that  enables  food  riots  to  occur.  Indeed,  these  results  
underscore the importance of sound macroeconomic policy as a guarantor of safety and 
stability. 
MODEL 2: QUALITY OF POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 
This model aims to evaluate the performance of governments in managing their political 
economies, which serves as a proxy to their capacity to respond effectively to contemporary 
food crises. Whereas the previous model emphasizes the financial capacity of governments, 
this one pays attention to the quality of national macroeconomic policy and governmental 
institutions. The guiding concept of this model is the notion that even financially capable 
governments may experience considerable challenges in safeguarding their populations from 
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sudden rises in food prices when systemic shortcomings in policy, management, and 
institutions are present. In other words, this model proposes that the most significant 
shortcomings in the capacity and performance of governments in responding to price crises 
are made possible by unsound or ineffective practices of economic governance, which in turn 
promote food-related civil unrest. In this sense, the second model is an antecedent to the 
quantitative variables of the first model. 
Governments  are  most  regularly  and  prominently  evaluated  by  the  Country  Policy  and  
Institutional Assessments (CPIAs) of the World Bank. CPIAs rate countries quantitatively 
against a range of criteria chosen and assessed by experts in macroeconomics; the scores are 
reviewed annually and offer direct comparisons between the management of the political 
economies. CPIAs are considered so significant that they are used by the World Bank and 
affiliated organizations to determine eligibility for development initiatives and lending 
programs. Although CPIAs cover a range of evaluations of governmental performance, only 
those with a direct relation to the political economy were included. It is important to realize 
that a couple countries in the dataset are missing CPIAs either because these countries are 
ineligible for International Development Association (IDA) programs or as a result of missing 
data. The following independent variables were included in the empirical analysis: 
1. CPIA  debt  policy  rating  –  scores  countries  according  to  the  extent  to  which  their  
public debt management policies are conducive to minimizing budgetary risks and 
ensuring the sustainability of long-term debt. Countries with poor scores are unlikely 
to maintain the borrowing capacity required to buffer price spikes when large treasury 
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reserves or budgetary surpluses are unavailable. This variable is conceptually related as 
a pretext to the variable on external debt stocks in the previous model. 
2. CPIA economic management cluster average –  scores  countries  according  to  an  
average of assessments on macroeconomic management, fiscal policy, and debt policy. 
As such, this score is the most general of the CPIAs in this research project with regard 
to the management of a political economy. Although this score is conceptually similar 
to every independent variable used by the previous model, save for the variable on 
development assistance, this score serves as a general pretext for the debt stocks, 
surplus/deficit, and total reserves variables in particular. 
3. CPIA equity of public resource use rating – scores countries according to the extent 
to which standard patterns of public expenditures and revenue collection affect the 
poor and are consistent with poverty reduction priorities. Because the poor usually 
spend more of their income on subsidence and because the poor are more often readily 
undernourished, taxation and public expenditures overlooking the poor render this 
group especially vulnerable to food price spikes and motivated to participate in civil 
unrest. This variable gives a more nuanced pretext to the gross savings variable in the 
previous model. 
4. CPIA financial sector rating – scores countries according to an assessment of the 
structure of the financial as well as the quality of the policies and regulations enacted 
to regulate the sector. Robust financial sectors provide investment opportunities for 
businesses and savings opportunities for consumers, which can contribute to 
government revenues and private savings. Since both private and public capital  are 
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essential to repelling the effects of food price spikes, this variable is conceptually most 
similar to the gross savings variable in the previous model. 
5. CPIA macroeconomic management rating – scores  countries  according  to  an  
assessment of macroeconomic management, which includes the framework of 
monetary, exchange rate, and aggregate demand policies. Although the scoring criteria 
of are similar to the aforementioned measure on the economic management cluster, 
this variable underscores the quality of policy over institutional structure. 
6. CPIA policy and institutions for environmental sustainability rating – scores countries 
according to the extent to which environmental policies manage pollution as well as 
support conservation and the sustainable use of natural resources. Sound 
environmental policies can safeguard domestic crop production as well as pave the way 
for sustainable economic growth in the long term. 
7. CPIA quality of budgetary and financial management rating – scores countries 
according to an evaluation of the economic planning and budgetary structure of the 
central government. In particular, this rating rewards countries that enact 
comprehensive and credible budgets motivated by clear policy priorities, governed by 
effective management mechanisms, and supported by accurate accounting and fiscal 
reporting. This variable is conceptually most similar to the surplus/deficit variable in 
the previous model, which connects significant surpluses and deficits to the capacity 
of governments in minimizing food crises during price spikes. 
6. CPIA trade rating – scores countries according to the extent to which their trade 
policies promote transnational trade in goods. For example, free trade agreements and 
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other consistent efforts to reduce trade barriers are rewarded in this assessment. The 
conceptual significance of this variable is the notion that prior integration with the 
structures of international trade render food imports more reliable and affordable 
during price spikes, tempering the consequences of food crises. 
Together, these variables attempt to capture expert evaluations of the quality of 
macroeconomic policies and the patterns of economic management that shape the capacity 
and performance of governments in responding to food price crises. 
The regression analysis for the second model reveals statistically significant correlations with 
five of the nine independent variables considered in the model. The assessment scores on the 
use of public resources, debt policy, fiscal policy, and both scores on economic management 
were significant at the standard alpha of 0.05. In contrast, the assessment scores on 
environmental policies and institutions, budgetary planning, and trade policies were not 
significant  at  any  reasonable  alpha  in  this  regression analysis.  A summary  of  the  statistical  
output is presented in the table below: 
Independent 
variable 
Odds ratio Coefficient P-value 
Debt policy 39041  2.46 0.014 
Overall econ mgmt 7.18-14 -2.34 0.019 
Public resources 0.2480 -2.25 0.024 
Fiscal policy 75953  2.63 0.009 
Financial sector 1.0230  0.04 0.970 
Macroecon mgmt 9858.1  2.05 0.041 
Env policy & instit 1.1304  0.27 0.785 
Budget planning 1.1755  0.28 0.776 
Trade policy 0.9491 -0.11 0.913 
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According to the results above, the following observations can now be made: 
- When countries enact debt policies and fiscal policies that attract strong assessment 
scores, they usually experience food-related civil unrest more frequently than other 
countries in the dataset. 
- When countries manage their political economies and allocate their public resources 
in ways that earn strong assessment scores, they tend to experience civil unrest less 
frequently than other countries. 
- There appears to be no statistically significant association between the quality of the 
private financial sector, environmental policies and institutions, trade policies, and the 
budgetary planning of the central government with the occurrence of food-related civil 
unrest. 
The results of the regression analysis of the second model point towards numerous intriguing 
insights on the relationship between the quality of economic policies and the performance of 
governments in managing the political economy. In addition, the results offer several parallels 
and points of comparison with the results of the previous model. Perhaps the most striking 
pattern among the results of the second model is that the quality of the direct management 
of the political economy is associated with significantly rarer food-related civil unrest, 
whereas the quality of wider economic policies are either not statistically significant or 
produce results in the opposite direction. The contrast between the associations of 
management over policy with the occurrence of civil unrest relates to the very nature of food 
crises and the challenges that such crises create for central governments. In other words, the 
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conceptually most straightforward explanation for these patterns in the regression analysis is 
the notion that food crises require quick and assertive action from central governments to 
minimize the consequences of such crises for the public. For such actions to reach results in 
significantly tempering the public impetus to riot on the streets, the governments initiating 
the actions must work with a robust institutional structure as well as maintain a strong grip 
on the political economy that conveys the crisis to the public. That is, an effective response 
occurs in the short term rather than the long term, provided that sufficient governmental 
capacity to that end exists in the first place.  
This is why the results of the policy assessments are confusing and where the results of the 
first model can assist in explaining the results of the second. According to the second model, 
superior debt and fiscal policies actually elevate the chance of food-related civil unrest among 
the countries in the dataset. At first, there is no conceptual explanation that would validate 
this correlation with ease, especially when one of the central assumptions of this paper—and 
one supported by the first model—is that properly managed fiscal environments ought to 
support  governments  in  their  endeavors  to  provide  for  the  public  even  when  price  spikes  
render food unmanageably expensive for portions of the population.  
There are a couple important reasons why the second model produced these results. The first 
is a contrast in the temporal contexts of the independent variables of the two models: the 
first model uses concrete measurements of the political economy of each country, which 
captures conditions in the immediate short-term and conveys any dramatic changes verbatim. 
In comparison, the second model uses third-party assessments by the World Bank—though 
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considered reliable and accurate—that measure policies and performance, which are not 
meant  to  change  abruptly  in  any  particular  direction  and  are  not  meant  to  measure  
governments in the short-term. In other words, the independent variables of the first model 
are  more  focused  on  results at  a  given  time  whereas  the  variables  of  the  second  are  more  
focused on intentions and trends over a period of time. Hence, countries may enact superior 
policies and receive good assessment marks without actually realizing the results necessary—
and the ones measured in the first model—to safeguard their populations from the effects of 
food crises.  
Secondly, this avenue of reasoning also applies to the statistical significance and conceptual 
congruence of the economic management variables of the second model. Assessments of 
economic management reflect the performance of a government and the quality of 
institutions, which are products of the culture of governance and the competence of the 
bureaucracy. That is, strong management practices and effective means of governance are 
inherently the result of long-term trends and very much unlike the policies measured by the 
other variables in the second model, which are often enacted swiftly and frequently mimic 
the recommendations (or even demands, as was the case with the Structural Adjustment 
Programs) of world financial institutions such as the World Bank.  
Nonetheless, one must carefully qualify the results of the second model with the properties 
of the statistical output. The strength of the second model over the first model is that the 
number of observations included in the regression analysis was markedly higher. This means 
that  missing  data  was  a  significantly  smaller  problem,  which is  rooted in  the  origin  of  the  
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variables of the first model as self-reported statistics and the origin of those of the second 
model in centralized assessments produced within the World Bank. In this case, assessments 
were only omitted with countries where metrics on policies and management were so scant 
or unreliable that an accurate assessment could not be produced. On the other hand, the 
primary shortcoming of the second model was an exceedingly low pseudo R2 score. As with 
the regression analysis for the previous model, the score conveys the extent to which the 
source data follows the statistical model and was a probably a product of the scattershot 
nature of the independent variable. However, such R2 scores do not always mean that the 
model is unusable or unreliable; in this case, the score reflects the ordinal nature of the 
independent variable, where countries were scored on a six-point scale that necessarily 
produces scattershot results with no ready semblance to a statistical model.  
MODEL 3: NATURE OF THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The purpose of this model is to consider the significance of the wider political environment 
as a constraint to the performance and capacity of governments as measured in the two 
previous models. Rather than measuring the resources available to a government or evaluating 
the quality of policy or management, this model endeavors to capture the effects of 
corruption, instability, and government credibility on the occurrence of food-related civil 
unrest; hence the variables assessed in this model define the foundation in which the variables 
of the other models operate. This may point to more systemic causes as precursors to the 
characteristics of the political economy, which this research paper suggests as central to the 
success of governments in forestalling food-related civil unrest. To that end, this model uses 
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the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank, which report the perceptions of 
a wide range of citizen and expert respondents on the political environment. In that way, the 
variables considered in this model resemble the expert assessments used to create the CPIA 
scores in the previous model. However, unlike the other models, there are no missing 
response data for any of the countries or years considered in this research project. Each of 
the variables are scored in units of a standard normal distribution, which ranges from about -
2.5 to 2.5, where higher scores denote more positive public perceptions. The following 
independent variables were included in the empirical analysis: 
1. Control of Corruption – captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain within governments by elites and private interests. This 
variable relates to the notion that rampant corruption in the political environment 
hampers every process of governance so that even superior policies and sound 
management endowed with sufficient resources may not translate into a robust 
political economy. 
2. Government Effectiveness – captures perceptions of the quality of public services and 
the credibility of government commitments to the public good. Unlike the ratings on 
management and policy explored in the previous model, this variable emphasizes 
rapport between the public and the private, which contributes crucially to prospects 
of civil unrest. 
3. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism – captures perceptions of the 
possibility that the government is crippled or overthrown by unconstitutional or 
violent means, such as politically-motivated violence or terrorism. Such perceptions 
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are particularly significant when they occur prior to the onset of civil unrest since they 
reflect upon complex dynamics involved in the relationship of governments and civil 
unrest. 
4. Rule of Law – captures perceptions of the prevalence of crime and violence as well as 
public confidence in the authority of law, ranging from property rights to the police 
and the courts. This variable is guided by the notion that a weak rule of law creates 
social inequities as well as a power vacuum that creates space for civil unrest to grow. 
5. Voice and Accountability – captures perceptions of the extent to which the public 
enjoys the freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free press, as well as 
the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting a representative 
government. This variable is most similar to the variables tested in Berazneva and Lee, 
and  it  is  included  in  the  model  for  the  same  conceptual  reason:  that  restrictive  
governments limit options for dissent and channel public expression to outbursts of 
riots and unrest. 
Together, these variables attempt to capture key characteristics of the political environment 
that may constrict the capacity of governments to properly manage their political economies, 
enact superior macroeconomic policy, and maintain a readiness in resources to respond to 
food price crises in ways that remove the impetus for civil unrest.  
The logistic regression analysis for the third model reveals statistically significant correlations 
with two of the five independent variables considered in the model. The variables on 
corruption control and political stability were both significant at the standard alpha of 0.05. 
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The variables on rights of expression, government effectiveness, and the rule of law are not 
significant at that alpha. A summary of the statistical output is presented in the table below: 
Independent 
variable 
Odds ratio Coefficient P-value 
Corruption 0.1537 -2.53 0.011 
Gov’t effectiveness 5.3325  1.82 0.069 
Political stability 0.3152 -3.16 0.002 
Rule of law 1.1522  0.12 0.905 
Voice and account 0.7985  1.31 0.192 
 
Given the results above, the following observations can now be made: 
- Better public perceptions of corruption control and political stability were associated 
with smaller frequencies of food-related civil unrest. The strength of the coefficients, 
the  odds  ratios,  and  the  small  sizes  of  the  p-values  indicate  strong  statistical  
associations with the dependent variable. 
- Public  perceptions  of  the  rule  of  law  and  the  public  voice  were  not  statistically  
associated with the occurrence of food-related civil unrest. The variable on 
government effectiveness comes close to significance, but the coefficient suggests a 
rise in incidences of civil unrest as public perceptions of government effectiveness rise. 
The results of the third statistical model provide several important observations about the 
nature of the wider political environment as a source of constraints to the capacity and 
performance of governments responding to food price crises as an alternative to the two prior 
models. Whereas those models emphasize various characteristics of the political economy in 
addition to the patterns of management and policy that shape that economy, this model 
investigates the environment in which the other models operate. While it is tempting to 
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conclude that the variables considered in this model constitute the true independent variables 
so that the variables in the two other models are merely intervening variables, one cannot run 
a logit regression with simultaneous variables across the three models to actually test that 
statement. For the sets of variable data in each of the models are sourced from mutually 
independent sources with entirely different measurements and sampling methods, it is 
improbable that such a statistical test would carry much construct validity at all. For that 
reason, the results of the third model ought to be considered as complementary rather than 
competing explanations.  
In that context, the results point to two characteristics of the political environment that are 
strongly  associated  with  the  occurrence  of  food-related  civil  unrest  and  make  much  
conceptual sense. The prevalence of corruption cripples effective governance by raising the 
transaction costs of government action and introducing private ulterior motives to decision-
making processes. Governments that operate in corrupt political environments arguably 
contend with many more challenges in enacting policy and managing their political economies 
in ways that contribute to a readiness to respond to food price crises. When such crises occur, 
corruption may misguide resources and stonewall any public response to such an extent that 
rioting and violence against the government itself becomes more attractive. Granted, 
corruption in political environments is so rampant among the countries in the dataset that 
the prevalence of corruption alone cannot predict the occurrence of civil unrest during food 
price crises. However, the variable does underscore the importance of eradicating corruption 
to enable governments to work to correct policy shortcomings and properly manage their 
political economies as measured in the two previous models.  
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The results of the variable on public perceptions of political stability produce especially 
fascinating  takeaways.  In  essence,  this  variable  asks  respondents  to  make  their  own  
predictions of the prospects of civil unrest, though not necessarily of civil unrest related 
strictly to food prices. While this is not to say that the variable inevitably measures the 
existence of a self-fulfilling prophecy, the variable does provide a conceptually robust 
measurement of the political environment in which civil unrest may or may not occur. Long-
running traditions of taking to the streets conceivably decrease public thresholds for renewed 
unrest, and the statistical results show that the variable is strongly associated with exactly that 
behavior.  Of  course,  what  the  model  cannot  show  is  whether  the  public  predicts  political  
instability due to civil unrest protesting a government failure to serve the people or due to 
other reasons, such as conflicts among elites or extraneous challenges to the regime. 
Nonetheless, the variable points to a pattern of food-related civil unrest where public 
perceptions of political stability are negative.  
Neither the variable on public perceptions of civic freedoms nor the variable on the rule of 
law were anywhere near statistical significance in the statistical model. Although the two 
variables seem conceptually appropriate, neither carries as much relevance to the mechanisms 
of civil unrest as the other variables in the model and probably suffers from only a cursory 
connection to the food riots that occurred in Africa during the price crisis several years ago. 
For example, weak public safety and unequal courts surely channel dissent to the streets, but 
not when governments, beyond their role as guarantors of civil protection under the law, 
employ  paramilitaries  to  stop  riots.  Such  shortcomings  surely  create  social  inequities  that  
stem social mobility, but probably not to the extent that food staples might get diverted as 
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they would in the hands of corrupt officials or under corrupt management practices. Similarly, 
restrictive governments surely elevate the chance of civil unrest in times of crisis, but then 
again most countries within the dataset ignore civil liberties to such an extent that other 
variables eclipse its significance in multiple logit regression analysis. At any rate, this model 
enjoys a more robust pseudo R2 score than the other two models—perhaps due to more 
orderly response data in the independent variables—and the dataset suffers from no missing 
data. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the variables in this model are sourced 
from survey samples rather than government-reported or expert-assessed metrics. 
CASE EXAMPLE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The significance of the empirical survey conducted in this research project remains 
ambiguous until it is examined in the context of a case example. For one, exploring case 
studies enables assessments of quantitative models within a concrete, qualitative context. 
Because statistical research only considers set samples and aims to produce generalizable 
results, case examples can test the external validity of those models by comparing them to 
actual cases within the sample. That is, case examples evaluate the congruence of the general 
with the specific. Moreover, case examples serve to explain quantitative variables in 
qualitative terms, which assists in understanding the practical significance of the statistical 
models and the ways in which those models are generalizable. In other words, case examples 
complement the limitations of statistical models in explaining specific cases in their own 
contexts, and they offer opportunities to better understand their strengths and shortcomings. 
Finally, case examples complete the circle of the quantitative research process when it is 
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motivated by observations of patterns among cases, quantified into generalizable models, and 
then evaluated again in the context of those cases. 
Among the countries in the statistical dataset, Egypt stands out as one of the more prominent 
examples of widespread civil unrest at least partially motivated by the 2007-2008 food price 
crisis. Egypt also makes for a particularly interesting case to examine as an example, because 
the  central  government  was  already  established  as  a  central  actor  in  the  national  food  
economy  for  decades  before  the  price  crisis  occurred.  At  the  same  time,  the  Egyptian  
government was confronted with protracted civil unrest that was so extensive and violent in 
nature that it profoundly jeopardized the capacity of the government to effectively execute 
policy to manage the availability and affordability of food necessities. Coupled with a 
continuous erosion of the economic viability of the central government over the course of 
many decades and thus the sustainability of the food assistance programs supported by that 
economy, Egypt emerges as an especially appropriate example at the confluence of 
government capacity and food-related civil unrest. 
Based on the results of the statistical models considered in this research project, one would 
expect to see the Egyptian economy characterized by at least some of the properties evaluated 
in the statistical models, such as extensive external debt stocks and chronic budgetary deficits. 
At the same time, one can expect a pattern of economic mismanagement and weak 
governance regardless of any sensible, strong policies that the government may have enacted. 
What the statistical models cannot predict and what the case studies serve to elucidate is the 
specific structure of the central government prior to the crisis, the nature of the Egyptian 
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response to the crisis, and the preponderance of the Egyptian public to take to the streets to 
protest the price hikes in the first place. Hence, statistical models may present opportunities 
to predict the occurrence of civil unrest but they cannot completely explain the specific 
experience of Egypt (or any other case in the study) during the crisis. 
The cornerstone of Egypt's food assistance strategy is a national subsidy program that is 
intended to grant low-income citizens access to otherwise unaffordable food items. The 
program is one of the primary components of the nation's social safety web as well as a 
mainstay of a wider political endeavor to promote social equity and political stability.34 
Accordingly, the proportions of the program are nothing short of stunning: in 2000, the 
program provided approximately 40% of the required minimum caloric intake among the 
low-income population while protecting as many as 730,000 people from extreme poverty.35 
The costs  of  the  program are  equally  spectacular:  as  much as  10% of  the  national  GDP is  
spent on subsidies each year.36 The importance of the program means that it garners 
continuous political attention and receives recurrent reforms according to concomitant 
political trends. However, the core of the program remains unchanged ever since it was 
conceived after the Second World War.37 Its primary component is the provision of 
significantly subsidized bread to everyone from public bakeries strewn across the country. In 
turn, the second component is a ration card program that enables low-income card recipients 
to purchase quotas of additional commodities from prearranged outlets at subsidized costs. 
                                               
34 Ahmed, Bouis, Gutner, & Löfgren, 2001 
35 Ramadan & Thomas, 2011 
36 Trego, 2011 
37 Ahmed et al., 2001 
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The significance of the subsidy programs to the society meant that maintaining their 
sustainability through times of crisis was an unequivocally essential endeavor in minimizing 
the growth of hunger and poverty in the country. Even with the programs in place, the average 
Egyptian spends 40.6% of earnings on food purchases, which renders most citizens very 
vulnerable to any price increases and exceedingly reliant on the subsidy programs—
particularly so among the 21% of the population below the national poverty line.38 At the same 
time, the country as a whole grew exceptionally reliant on food imports when rapid population 
growth  coincided  with  slow  growth  in  wheat  production  in  the  1960s.  The  continued  
allocation of foreign exchange reserves to food imports resulted in severe deficits and 
proliferating debt; both of these metrics are assessed in the first set of empirics and revealed 
as  significant  determinants  of  civil  unrest.  Egyptians  have  an  extensive  history  of  mass  
protests, and the escalating contradictions between mounting debt and continued subsidy 
programs translated into  violent  protests  already  during  the  reign  of  President  Sadat,  who 
announced major cuts to the subsidy programs in exchange for IMF assistance in financing 
the national deficit. Despite vast growth of expensive wheat imports, these riots set an 
enduring political precedent that favored the status quo over reforms and set the political 
context for the government's response to the 2007-2008 crisis. By the onset of the crisis, 
Egypt's domestic wheat production was so inadequate in satisfying demand that the country 
became the second largest importer of wheat in the world.39 Since the crisis, Egyptian wheat 
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imports have continued to grow so much that the country is now the world's largest wheat 
importer.40 
The successes of the subsidy programs in guaranteeing the availability of affordable staples 
and contributing to declining rates of malnutrition and infant mortality are widely recognized. 
Indeed, national poverty estimates could rise to about 34% were the subsidy programs 
removed and equivalent commodities purchased at nonsubsidized prices.41 Despite much 
evidence of success and the mounting costs of the program to the Egyptian government, the 
subsidy programs were unable to prevent rioting during the food price crisis in 2007 and 
onwards. In many ways, the failure of the subsidy programs to maintain a satisfied population 
was a culmination of fundamental shortcomings in the structures of the program along with 
an accumulation of crippling weaknesses in the Egyptian political economy. The cost of the 
subsidy program was a recurring concern of successive governments and international 
development organizations, but so was the specter of renewed rioting to protest any cuts to 
the program. In response, cycles of reform were enacted gradually but regularly, and persistent 
trends in downsizing the program meant that far fewer people were incorporated into the 
ration card system at the time of the food price crisis when compared to the decades that 
preceded it.42 These trends were jumpstarted in the 1980s when President Mubarak’s 
government removed many commodities previously covered by the ration cards, made ration 
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cards with partial subsidies available to high income citizens, and dropped the practice of 
adding newborns to the ration cards of their households. 
But when market prices skyrocketed in 2007, the government actually reversed these trends 
and greatly expanded access to the ration cards: an unprecedented 22 million previously 
unqualified citizens were now given ration cards while the partial subsidies aimed at upper-
income citizens were replaced with full subsidies.43 At the same time, the number of 
commodities covered by the ration cards was augmented with pasta, fava beans, tea, and 
others. The combination of a growing population of ration card users and precipitously rising 
market prices meant that these reforms came at an enormous cost to the Egyptian 
government: in 2007-2008, expenditures related to the subsidy programs exceeded original 
budget  allocations  by  an  astonishing  $1.07  billion  to  account  for  a  total  of  $2.82  billion  in  
costs.44 To make up for the unexpected expenditures, the government raised numerous taxes 
while enacting deep cuts to public support systems such as fuel subsidies. For that matter, 
enacting such an array of rapid reforms to the subsidy programs as a response to the price 
crisis reflected equally upon Egypt's scores among the variables of the quantitative study as 
well. The scramble for money increased the deficit from 4.56% of GDP at the onset of the 
price crisis to 10.08% of GDP by 2010, and a considerable proportion of this increase is 
attributable to proliferating food subsidy expenditures, which rose from $2.36 billion to $4.69 
billion within the same time period.45 Therefore, the quantitative study accurately predicts 
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the occurrence of riots in Egypt when the political economy is characterized by mounting 
deficits, and the case example reveals the context of the mounting deficits as a series of policy 
decisions to that end. Together, the quantitative results with the qualitative context create 
the opportunity to suggest more prudent fiscal policy. 
The government’s preference to pump more resources into an existing structure of a social 
safety net rather than embark on comprehensive reform programs was quintessential of a 
weak government without the managerial capacity necessary to allocate resources efficiently. 
The vast expansion of the subsidy programs to account for the crisis was arguably a populist 
policy of convenience that neglected to address underlying inequities and inefficiencies. In 
fact, such patterns of governance are prototypical of developing countries where inadequate 
institutions preclude carrying out efficient economic reform. Leila Frischtak of the World 
Bank points out that the seemingly unsurmountable paradox facing governments such as 
Egypt’s is that comprehensive economic reforms often give rise to conflicts of interest within 
the very government campaigning for reform, because such platforms for reform usually aim 
to reduce the extent of government command of the national economy.46 At the same time, 
enacting reforms always tests the capacity and efficiency of economic management, because 
activating such reforms requires an appropriate amount of government control in the first 
place. Robust economic reforms also preclude compromises with the narrow special interest 
groups that so often maintain profound power among weaker governments or partial 
democracies, let alone authoritarian regimes such as President Mubarak's. While good 
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economics sometimes make good politics only in the long term, authoritarian governments 
experiencing widespread political opposition rarely enact policy outside the range of the 
popular political memory.47 
The conundrum surrounding the unsustainability of Egypt's response to the price crisis 
coupled with its failure to stop public outrage and violent unrest is not whether the subsidy 
system can serve as a buffer against worldwide price shocks. For that matter, the Egyptian 
public considers the subsidy programs as powerful symbols for the social contract between 
the population and any governing regime.48 Instead, the conundrum was created when the 
government expanded the program without respect to maintaining the intended purpose of 
providing food staples to those who could not afford them. For example, the neediest could 
not benefit from expanding ration card ownership across society and instead suffered from 
excessive wait times at overburdened ration outlets, where waits regularly exceeded two 
hours. Likewise, extending complete subsidy benefits to upper-income citizens and 
incorporating non-essential items like tea into the realm of the subsidy programs were useless 
for providing the safety net that the program promised to provide. Because the wealthy 
consume more, subsidy spending benefits the rich much more than the poor, and caloric 
deprivation is closely correlated with poverty levels.49 Furthermore,  leakage  of  subsidized  
commodities to black markets represents as much as 31% of the supply of bread and 20% of 
the supply of sugar and cooking oil.50 While the subsidy programs were exemplary endeavors 
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of ensuring the availability of food necessities without the complexities and accounting 
challenges of income transfers to citizens, the mistargeted expansion of the programs 
fundamentally compromised their efficacy. 
The experience of the food subsidy programs strongly corroborates the results of the 
quantitative models. For one, the Egyptian economy prior to the crisis was characterized by 
many of the same properties of a political economy that the first model associates with the 
occurrence of civil unrest. Most importantly, the subsidy programs rendered the country 
increasingly reliant on loan money to cover persistent government deficits.51 Egypt may 
eventually reach a point where loan money is no longer as readily available from international 
institutions  and  more  wealthy  allies  in  the  Arab  World,  which  would  constrain  the  
government's capacity for any sort of response to future price crises. Second, the government 
enacted sound policy by maintaining the subsidy programs but mismanaged its response to 
the food crisis by mistargeting resources and assistance programs, which is a pattern that the 
second empirical model associated with civil unrest. However, the continued operation of the 
core of those programs surely dampened the consequence of the price crisis to fomenting 
more civil unrest. Finally, the political environment considered in the third quantitative 
model in pre-crisis Egypt was absolutely ripe for the type of mass riots that the country 
experienced during the food price crisis: the population maintains long-running traditions of 
food protests and the government was riddled in corruption.52 Thus the empirical pathway 
charted in the quantitative models seems to corroborate Egypt's experience during the crisis. 
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Unless sweeping changes to current patterns of food production and consumption in Egypt 
occur and unless transnational institutions work to radically alter the current configuration 
of  the  worldwide  economy  of  food  commodities,  it  appears  very  plausible  to  assume  that  
global price shocks will continue to affect the accessibility and affordability of food staples in 
Egypt  and  other  countries  in  similar  situations.  At  the  same  time,  climate  change  and  
changing patterns in demographics may potentially exacerbate the scope and frequency of 
such shocks. Therefore, drawing concrete and actionable lessons in policy is vital for the 
purpose of minimizing the human costs of such crises and maintaining political and social 
order. 
CONCLUSION 
This research paper endeavors to contribute to the academic conversation on the occurrence 
of civil unrest and violent protests connected to food price crises by focusing on the crisis of 
2007-2008, and both the quantitative models as well as the case example surely accomplish 
just that. Whereas the quantitative models are not strong enough to make causal claims as to 
the hypothesis of this project—that the presence of certain properties of the political 
economy increases the chance of civil unrest—the statistical associations are quite evident 
and are comprehensively corroborated by examining Egypt as a case example. Those 
associations create interesting new paths for academic study and raise important questions 
about the nature of government responses to price crises as well as the economic factors that 
deserve attention when safeguarding populations from those crises. As such, this paper does 
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not challenge alternative explanations presented in previous and parallel literature on the 
topic.  
Since the phenomenon of civil unrest is astonishingly complex and controlling for every factor 
is virtually impossible, the tiered approach to the quantitative models in this paper provided 
more perspective to the research question than three separate models without any 
connections to define the relationships between the models. Although integrating 
independent variables from each of the three models into a combined model was not possible, 
the significance of the results combined with conceptual congruence with the case example 
point to findings that ought to be researched further in the future. Since the extreme weather 
associated with climate change and the uneven economic growth associated with 
globalization will likely continue to increase the frequency of food price crises, policymakers 
must pay more attention to the systemic causes promoting such price crises and adopt policies 
that minimize the cost of any such crises to the public. For when price crises affect significant 
swaths of populations, the chance of civil unrest grows, which stagnates economies and 
renders governments unstable. As the empirics and the case example of this research project 
suggest, policymakers ought to redouble their efforts in targeting assistance programs more 
effectively, maintaining financial capacity to enact short-term assistance programs, and 
embark on programs to improve the managerial effectiveness within the governments 
themselves. Alas, no efforts can produce satisfactory results when the political environments 
are marred by corruption and chronic instability; these can only be improved by prolonged 
efforts both within the political elites and the general public, which must demand better 
government. For example, it remains to be seen whether the Egyptian revolution translates 
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into an improved political environment that enables effective government and quality policies 
on food prices in the years to come. 
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ANNEX: COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE DATASET 
Algeria 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi  
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic
  
Chad 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Djibouti  
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda  
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Tunisia 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
